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This article surveys 2014 developments in National Security Law relevant to interna-
tional lawyers.'
I. Russia, Ukraine, and Hybrid Warfare
The use of proxy military actors in today's international conflicts requires detailed anal-
yses of both methodology and the use of "Hybrid Warfare" in obfuscating the lines of
legal attribution and responsibility under international law. Direct Russian military en-
gagement in, and the failure to restrain incursions emanating from its territory into
Ukraine, may underscore Russia's breach of its international legal obligations.2
A. EVIDENCE OF THE FEDERATION S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE UKRAINE
According to Ukrainian sources, approximately twelve hours prior to the invasion of the
Crimea in late February 2014, a Ukrainian correspondent traveling along the Black Sea
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Developments was contributed by Geoffrey M. Goodale, Attorney, Trade Law Advisors PLLC. The views
expressed herein by the military officers are those of the authors personally and are not official or reflective of
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1. For developments during 2013, see James D. Carlson et al., National Security Law, 48 INT'L LAw. 471
(2014).
2. The Commentary to the United Nations Legislative Series states: "The general rule is that the only
conduct attributed to the State at the international level is that of its organs of government, or of others who
have acted under the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the State." United
Nations Legislative Series, MATERIALS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY
WRONGFUL ACTs 27, Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER B/25, available at http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/docu-
ments/Book25/Book25.pdf. It is further noted "as a corollary, that [the] conduct of private persons is not as
such attributable to the State . . . ." Id. However, "the different rules of attribution stated in chapter II have a
cumulative effect, such that a State may be responsible for the effects of the conduct of private parties, if it
failed to take necessary measures to prevent those effects." Id. at 28.
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Highway from Sevastapol to Yalta spotted two Russian military lorries with tightly closed
tents headed in the direction of the Russian military base in Sevastopol.3 The correspon-
dent followed the lorries until they stopped at a Russian military sanitarium in Yalta.
There he observed a serviceman exiting the lorry wearing full military garb with no mili-
tary insignia. This was the debut of the "Little Green Men"4 in Ukraine.
Russia's initial statement about this incident provides further evidence of its direct in-
volvement. The treaty between Ukraine and Russia regarding Russia's Black Sea Fleets
requires Russia to provide Ukraine with preliminary notification when military convoys
move between Russian military installations in Crimea.6 Absent notification, the Ukrain-
ian military command requested a written explanation pursuant to the treaty. The Rus-
sian Black Sea Fleet allegedly responded that "there is a very unstable situation in Ukraine
and as a result, a limited military regiment was sent for better protection of sanitarium
visitors."7
Thereafter, according to the same source,8 at midnight lorries left the sanitarium in
Yalta and moved to the Crimean capital, Simferopol. These lorries contained groups of
servicemen from the highly trained Airborne Brigade from Toljatty, Russia, which, ac-
cording to Ukrainian sources, were administratively attached to the main department of
military intelligence of the Russian army and fleet.9 At approximately 14:00 hours, the
forces arrived at the Crimean Parliament, disarmed the Ukrainian militia, and captured
and exercised full military control over the area. Early the next morning, forces conducted
a full-scale invasion, with "Little Green Men" occupying all airports and seaports, and
surrounding Ukrainian military bases and other key tactical and strategic installations.1o
These forces were portrayed by the Russian media as self-organized, local self-defense
organizations."
3. Id.
4. Steve Pifer, Opinion: Watch Out for Little Green Men, DER SPIEGEL, July 7, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/
international/europe/nato-needs-strategy-for-possible-meddling-by-putin-in-baltic-states-a-979707.html
(explaining the etymology of the term, "little green men").
5. Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet Russ.-Ukr., art. 15, para. 2, May
28, 1997, available at https://archive.today/ue0rj (translated through Google translator) [hereinafter Black Sea
Fleet Agreement].
6. Commentary of the MPA of Ukraine concerning the unilateral breach of the Russian Federation the Ukraine-
Russia accords, laid down in the Agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, http://greece.mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/
news/18552-komentar-mzs-ukrajini (Mar. 2, 2014); Black Sea Fleet Agreement, supra note 5.
7. According to Ukrainian sources to whom the author has access, this reply was posted together with a
video on Feb. 26, 2014, and subsequently removed.
8. Id.
9. Confidential sources at the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs (to whom the author's sources have
access).
10. David McHugh & Greg Keller, Hundreds of Gunmen Surround Ukraine Military Base in Crimea, Busi-
NESS INSIDER INDONESIA (Mar. 2, 2014, 9:43PM), http://www.businessinsider.co.id/hundreds-of-gunmen-
surround-ukraine-military-base-in-crimea-2014-3/#.VHvnNLF-So.
11. Corey Flintoff, Russian Media Accused of Using Propaganda in Ukraine Reporting, NAT'L PUBLIC RADIO
(Apr. 15, 2014, 5:17AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/15/303172312/russian-media-accused-of-feeding-
propaganda-on-ukraine-crisis; Oleg Sulkov, The Media War Behind the Ukraine Crisis, THE Moscow TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/the-media-war-behind-the-ukraine-crisis/
495920.html.
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Russian "Hybrid Warfare" may also involve the use of recently retired military and
Russian Secret Service officers.12 Such personnel may possess experience in past intense
military conflict. This ensures the inability to directly attribute any military activity to
official organs of the Russian Federation.
On February 28, 2014, more than 150 "Little Green Men" on four lorries attacked and
captured the main Crimean civilian airport in Simferopol.1 3 They were headed by Colo-
nel Igor "Strelkov" Gyrkin, who retired from the Russian Federal Security Service before
the attack. Throughout his career, he participated in numerous military and paramilitary
conflicts, including those in Transnistria in Bosnia (on the side of Serbian Army), and in
the two Chechnya wars.14 In early April, he crossed the Russian-Ukrainian boarder in the
Donetsk region with a special assault unit and declared himself the "Defense Minister of
the Donetsk Peoples' Republic.""
In a recent interview in the Moscow newspaper "Tomorrow,"1 6 Colonel Gyrkin explic-
itly recognized his role in initiating activities in Ukraine. He stated, "In a certain way, the
war trigger was pushed by me. If my unit did not cross the border, everything would have
finished as in Kharkiv and Odessa. Some people would have been killed, some-arrested,
but nothing would have happened."17
Hybrid warfare may also involve circumvention of international legal obligations, while
at the same time maintaining the utility of same. This is exemplified by the Russian Fed-
eration's apparent circumvention of its agreement with the Ukraine concerning the prohi-
bition of intelligence operations by and between the organs of the Russian and Ukrainian
Foreign and Military Intelligence Services.1S Russian President Vladimir Putin created
the Fifth Main Intelligence Department, a new organization inside the Federal Security
Services under the title "Department of Actual Information about International Coopera-
12. HymuH oipulaem Ha7ule y Poccuu wrnoe auneKcuu wiu decma6unusatquu eocmoruou YKpaunbi [Putin
denies that Russian has plans for annexation or destabilize Eastern Ukraine], http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/
putin-russia-has-no-plans-to-annex-or-destabilize-ukraine/1929789.html (Tun. 4, 2014).
13. Shaun Walker et al., Russian 'invasion' of Crimea fuels fear of Ukraine conflict, GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 28,
2014, 19:27PM, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/28/russia-crimea-white-house.
14. Noah Sneider, Shadowy Rebel Wields Iron Fist in Ukraine Fight, N.Y. TMEs (July 10, 2014); Peter Leo-
nard, Meet Igor Strelkov, The Face of the Insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/29/igor-strelkov-ukraine n 5235368.html.
15. Id. See also Gianluca Mezzofiore, Igor Strelkov admits Russia FSB affiliation in Kremlin-censored interview,
INT'L BUSINESS TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/igor-strelkov-admits-russia-fsb-affiliation-
kremlin-censored-interview-1477713.
16. CnycKoeou' Kpio' oK 6iffohe ece-maKiu Haca7 A3. Ecau 6b1 naut ompuid ne nepeuen zpatunly, a umoze ece 6?
1n/uOCb, KGaK e XapWO6e, KaK 6 Odecce. Ebl,7O bl HCCKObKO )CC3iMK0fIO6 yCUmblX, OGOCelllhbx, apecmuealillblX.
HI a 3TOM 6bl KOHlHJOCb [Girkin Triggered War], KIEvSMJ.NET, http://www.microsofttranslator.com/
BV.aspx?ref=IE8Activity&a=http%3A%2F%2Fkievsmi.net%2Fnovosti%2Fukraina%2F53203-strelkov-
spuskovoj-kryuchok-vojny-vse-taki-nazhal-ya.html (Nov. 20, 2014).
17. ,Jueepcan Tupicwu CxD Ha ce6 omeemcmeHHOCMb 3a HOiatw 801nHb [Saboteur Girkin took responsibility
for starting the war], LIGA.NET, http://news.liga.net/news/politics/4124022-diversant-girkin-vzyal-na-sebya-
otvetstvennostza.nachalovoyny.htm (Nov. 20, 2014); Anna Dolgov, Russia's Igor Strelkov: I Am Responsible
for War in Eastern Ukraine, THE MOSCOW TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/
article/russias-igor-strelkov-i-am-responsible-for-war-in-eastern-ukraine/511584.html.
18. TV News Channel 24, MocKab, B JIyeaucKe cudum IshmoeFlaenoeynpa7enue OCEPoccuu [Moscal: In
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tion."1 9 This department does not have any agreements with the Ukrainian Security Ser-
vice and conducts intelligence activities in the Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.20
II. International Response to Iran's Nuclear PrograM21
Over the past year, the so-called P5+1 and Iran,2 2 facilitated by the European Union,
have been negotiating towards a permanent, comprehensive agreement to ensure peaceful
use of Iran's nuclear program. Efforts through the year included six rounds of technical
meetings between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) and Te-
hran, 23 as well as seven rounds of political-level meetings between the parties. 24 The par-
ties ultimately failed to come to a final agreement for the second time in the past year but
agreed to a seven-month extension of the interim foundational agreement, the Joint Plan
of Action (JPOA).25 The JPOA is a six-month interim agreement between Iran and the
P5+1 signed on November 23, 2013. It lays out an approach towards a long-term solution
to address international concerns over Iran's nuclear program and is renewable by mutual
agreement. 26 This second extension extends the deadline for a permanent agreement to
June 30, 2015, with an interim deadline of March 31, 2015 for a general framework.
The additional extension was not a surprise. Despite recurring reports of earnest dis-
cussions as the year progressed, the negotiations are obviously complex, complicated,27
and, in various aspects, "interdependent." 28 After the second extension, and similar to last
year when the JPOA was announced, some in the United States Senate felt increased
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. This brief overview should be read in conjunction with the last two Year-in-Review articles from the
National Security Law Committee, National Security Law, 48 INT'L LAw 474 (2014) and National Security
Law, 47 INT'L LAw 456 (2013).
22. The P5+1 was coined to signify the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Ger-
many. The group is also referred to as the E3/EU+3, signifying the three involved EU nations (i.e., United
Kingdom, France, and Germany) plus the United States, Russia, and China.
23. LIEA and Iran: Chronology of Key Events,, INT'L ATomic ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/new-
scenter/focus/iran/chronology-of-key-events (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
24. See Timelie ofNuclear Diplomacy with Iran, ARMs CONTROL Ass'N, https://www.armscontrol.org/fact-
sheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran (noting six rounds of political-level discussions, plus the
November rounds leading up to the second JPOA extension).
25. EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERV., http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/13 1124_03_en.pdf.
26. EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERv., Factsheet, E3/EU+3 Nuclear Negotiations with Iran: Terms of the
Agreement on a oint Plan ofAction, Including Measures to be Taken ly the European Union, Doc. No. 1312 19/02,
Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131219_02_en.pdf.
27. Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, Remarks at a Symposium on P5+1 Iran Nuclear Negotia-
tions, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Oct. 23, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/p/us/
rm/2014/233306.htm.
28. Louis Charbonneau & Justyna Pawlak, Six Powers, Iran Enter Crunch Phase of Nuclear Diplomacy,
REUTERS (May 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/iran-nuclear-idUSL6NONZ62E20140
514.
VOL. 49
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
NATIONAL SECURITY 377
sanctions were in order to compel an agreement. 2 9 However, Tehran posited increased
sanctions would be a deal breaker. 30
The reporting period started out optimistically in November 2013 with the signing of
the JPOA. On January 12, 2014, the P5+1 and Iran followed up by agreeing to technical
understandings to implement the JPOA.31 The technical understandings "create[d] space
and time to negotiate a comprehensive resolution to this issue" 32 and are primarily for the
IAEA, which is tasked with implementing the agreement.33 The understandings establish
what IAEA officials should be looking for when they visit facilities, what information
IAEA officials can expect from Iran, and when to expect it.A4 This information will enable
IAEA officials to carry out managed access to new facilities they had not visited as part of
their regular monitoring activities. Additionally under the JPOA, Iran is required to halt
enrichment of uranium over 5% and to take tiered actions to dilute 20% enriched ura-
nium hexafluoride (UF6 ), such that it will be eliminated at the end of the six-month-
agreement period.35 According to the IALEA, Iran has met these obligations, though it has
continued to enrich UF6 up to 5%.36
Cynicism against Iran's efforts gained traction after the announcement by IAEA Direc-
tor General Yukiya Amano, on the eve of the November 2014 political talks between the
P5+1 and Iran, that he was "still unable to provide 'credible assurance' Iran had no un-
declared nuclear material and activities."37 The Agency cited concerns over construction
activity at the Parchin military installation "likely to have further undermined the
Agency's ability to conduct effective verification. It remains important for Iran to provide
answers to the Agency's questions and access to the Parchin military facility."38
29. Niels Lesniewski, Republicans Push for More Iran Sanctions as Talks are Extended, ROLL CALL (Nov. 24,
2014), http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/republicans-push-for-more-sanctions-on-iran-as-talks-are-extended/.
30. Matthew Lee & George Jahn, Iran Nuclear Talks Extended Until ]uly hut Threatened by Potential Sanctions,
DENVER POST (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_27005717/iran-nuclear-talks-
extended-until-july-but-threatened.
31. Background Briefing on the Implementation Plan of the P5+1 and Iran's First Step Nuclear Agreement, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/219571.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MONITORING AND VERIFICATION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN IN RELATION TO THE JOINT PLAN OF ACTION T 6, GOV/2014/2 (Jan. 17, 2014), available at http://
www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2O14-2.pdf.
35. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, Background Briefing on the Implementation Plan of the P5+1 and Iran's First Step
Nuclear Agreement, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/219571.htm, visited Jan. 15, 2014.
36. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TT 12-
14, Doc. No. GOV/2014/58 (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2014-58
.pdf.
37. Frederick Dahl, Iran Still Stalling as Nuclear Deadline Looms-UN. Agency, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://in.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=INKCNOJ41BF20141120.
38. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Implementation ofthe NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions
of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Repubhlic of Iran T 59, IAEA Doc. GOV/2014/58 (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2014-58.pdf (internal citations omitted).
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III. Nuclear Arms Control
In its 2014 Compliance Report 39 the U.S. State Department declared the Russian Federa-
tion to be "in violation of its obligations under the INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces]
Treaty4 o not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such
missiles."41 The United States called for immediate talks on the reported violation and for
prompt steps by Russia to cure it. The Russian Foreign Ministry denied the missile in
question violated the treaty and repeated earlier claims (which the United States has de-
nied) that the United States is violating the treaty with some of the missiles used in missile
defense tests and with the development of some armed drones. 42 As of late November
2014, the disputes remained unresolved, but both parties expressed a desire to continue
talks and preserve the treaty.4 3
In April 2015, the next Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT)44 will begin at the United Nations in New York. The United Nations' 2014 NPT
Preparatory Committee was unable to agree on a final statement.4 5 There was sharp disa-
greement4 6 between the nuclear-weapons states recognized by the NPT47 and a majority
of the non-nuclear weapons states over the pace of progress under Article VI of the
NPT.48 Article VI provides all parties agree "to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament." 49 During the United Nations' First Committee debate on nuclear
weapons in October 2014,50 155 non-nuclear weapons states submitted a joint statement
39. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf.
40. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimi-
nation of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles U.S.-Russ., available at http://www.state
.gov/t/avc/trty/102 360.htm.
41. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf.
42. US Statements that Russia Breaks INF Treaty Unfounded-FM, TAss RussIAN NEws AGENCY (July 30,
2014), http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/742972.
43. Statement by Rose Gottemoeller, U.S. Dep't of State, Under Secretary for Arms Control and Interna-
tional Security, America's Commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(Nov. 18, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/234157.htm.
44. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
45. Stokholm Int'l Peace Research Institute, 2014 NPT PrepComm: Day 10, http://www.sipri.org/re-
search/disarmament/2014-npt-prepcomm/day-10 (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
46. See, e.g., Women's Int'l League for Peace and Freedom, NPT News in Review, Vol. 12, No. 11, availa-
ble at http://reachingcritical will.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/NIR2014/No. 11 .pdf.
47. United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China, which are also the Permanent Members of
the U.N. Security Council, frequently referred to as "the P5."
48. Compare, e.g., Statement by Mikhail I. Uliyanov, Head of Delegation of the Russian Federation to the
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 1: Disarmament) (Apr. 30, 2014), with Statement by Amb. Patricia
O'Brien on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. Both statements are available at http://reachingcritical will
.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/2014/statements (click on the respective statements under
"Cluster One, Wednesday 30 April 2014").
49. NPT, Art. VI.
50. The First Committee, consisting of all U.N. member states, "considers all disarmament and interna-
tional security matters within the scope of the [U.N.] Charter." Disarmament and International Security, Gen.
Assembly of the U.N., http://www.un.org/en/ga/first. First Committee resolutions are normally adopted as a
matter of course by the General Assembly when it meets in plenary session.
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citing the "catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons" and calling for
their "total elimination."s1
On April 24, 2014, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) filed applications 5 2 in
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the nine nuclear-weapons states53 seeking
declaratory judgment that the Respondents have breached obligations, recognized by the
ICJ in a 1996 advisory opinion, "to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotia-
tions leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective interna-
tional control."54 The RMI's claims against the five NPT signatories rely on both the
NPT and customary international law. The RMI's claims as to the non-signatory states
are based solely on customary international law. The United Kingdom, India, and Paki-
stan have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in cases where the other party
has also accepted compulsory jurisdiction, which the RMI has. None of the remaining six
nuclear states has agreed to jurisdiction in this case, and China has already stated it will
not do so. The RMI has also filed a parallel case in federal district court in San Francisco,
California, against the United States alone. The Department of Justice has filed a motion
to dismiss on justiciability grounds.5 5
One current dispute between the P5 and non-nuclear weapons states relates to the
modernization of nuclear arsenals. In response to concerns that such modernization was
inconsistent with progress toward nuclear disarmament, the parties to the NPT agreed at
the 2010 NPT Review Conference to recognize "the interests of non-nuclear weapons
states in the constraining by the nuclear weapons states of the development and qualitative
improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of
nuclear weapons."5 6 In 2014, however, all of the nuclear-weapons states are proceeding
with the modernization and qualitative enhancement of their nuclear arsenals (and, in the
cases of India and Pakistan, with quantitative increases as well).57 For example, the U.S.
Air Force, in addition to a new penetration bomber, is seeking an enhanced air-launched
cruise missile that will provide "lower yield options" and "more targeting flexibility." 58
The United States, however, has declared its modernization program is not intended to
51. http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/lcom/1coml4/statements/
200ctNewZealand.pdf.
52. Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, No. 2014/18 (Apr. 25, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
presscom/files/0/18300.pdf.
53. China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States of America, and India, Pakistan, Israel, and
North Korea.
54. 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, para.105(2)F
55. Marshall Islands v. United States, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, Case No.
3:2014-cv-01885.
56. 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document I(b)(4).
57. Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, Slowing Nuclear Weapons Reductions and Endless Nuclear Weapons
Modernizations: a Challenge to the NPT, BULL. OF THE ATomic SCIENTISTs 2014, http://bos.sagepub.com/
content/70/4/94.full.
58. Hans M. Kristensen, Fed'n of American Scientists, W80-1 Warhead Selected for New Nuclear Cruise
Missile, Oct.10, 2014, http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/10/w80-llrso/.
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develop new nuclear warheads, missions, or capabilities,5 9 and repeated these assurances in
the 2014 U.N. debates. 60
The government of Austria announced it would host an international conference on
December 8-9, 2014, in Vienna, on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear explo-
sions.6 1 The United States, although it had joined a P5 boycott of earlier conferences on
the same subject,62 announced in November that the United States would participate in
the Vienna Conference but would not treat it as a forum for arms control negotiations.6 3
IV. Information and Intelligence Developments
A. INTELLIGENCE CASES IN U.S. COURTS
Several high profile cases made their way through the U.S. courts regarding the extent
to which the National Security Agency's (NSA's) surveillance program comports with the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Klayman v. Obama, Judge Richard J.
Leon of the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia ruled that the counterterror-
ism program that collects telephone metadata violated the Fourth Amendment. He
barred the government from collecting any data associated with the plaintiff.64 The court
reasoned that the database never truly served the purpose of rapidly identifying terrorist in
time-sensitive investigations. 6 Although the government publicly asserted that the NSA's
surveillance program has prevented fifty-four terrorist attacks, no evidence was submitted
to back the claim. 66
On appeal, the government argued the collection of the metadata did not amount to a
search under the Fourth Amendment because individuals voluntarily shared the data with
a third party provider, namely, telephone companies. 67 The government further stated
that there was no protected constitutional interest that had been violated by the collection
of business records from a telephone company. 68
59. E.g., U.S. DEPT OF DEFENSE, NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEw REPORT(April 2010), availale at http://
www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%2ONuclear%2OPosture%2OReview%2OReport.pdf.
60. Statement by Ambassador Robert Wood to the U.N. General Assembly, Thematic Dehate on Nuclear
Weapons (Oct. 20, 2014).
61. Republic of Austria, Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, http://www
.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons-and-
nuclear-terrorism/vienna-conference-on-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons/ (last visited Dec. 7,
2014).




63. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Spokesperson, United States Will Attend the Vienna
Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2014/11/233868.htm.
64. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 67 (D.D.C. 2013).
65. Id. at 62-66.
66. Id.
67. Josh Gerstein, Anti-NSA ruling in ]eopardy, POLITICO (Nov. 4 2014), http://www.politico.com/blogs/
under-the-radar/2014/1 1/antinsa-ruling-in-jeopardy- 198151 html.
68. Id. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard oral
arguments on November 2, 2014.
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Klayman stands in stark contrast to ACLU v. Clapper, which was heard in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York. Judge William H. Pauley III upheld
the NSA's bulk telephone metadata collection program. 69 The court reasoned that al-
though the program vacuums up virtually all telephone calls to and from the United
States, it is still subject to executive and congressional oversight. 70 The court further ex-
plained there is no evidence the government used the information gathered from the bulk
telephone metadata collection program for any purpose other than investigating and dis-
rupting terrorist attacks.7 1
Like Klayman, the ACLU case is also on appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit heard arguments regarding the constitutionality of the program on September 2,
2014, and raised questions regarding the statutory scheme under which the program oper-
ates, specifically Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.72 This provision enables intelli-
gence organizations to request that the FISA Court order the production of documents or
other tangible things relevant to an authorized national security investigation.7 3
The ACLU argued that Section 215 does not apply to telephone metadata and there-
fore the program is not statutorily allowed.74 The government stressed the protections
that surround the information collected in the program and argued that the gathering of
routine information, such as time and duration of phone calls, falls squarely within the
Fourth Amendment. 75
This circuit split may well find its way to the United States Supreme Court.
B. INTELLIGENCE AND THE U.S. EXECUTIVE
On January 17, 2014, President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive/
PPD-28 concerning Signal Intelligence Activity.7 6 The directive seeks to advance the
United States' national security and foreign policy interests and to protect its citizens, and
the citizens of its allies and partners, from harm, while also protecting legitimate privacy
interests.77
The directive makes clear that all signals collection must be authorized by and con-
ducted pursuant to legislation, executive order, or proclamation. Collection of signals
intelligence shall not be used to suppress or burden criticism or dissent or to disfavor
69. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
70. Id. at 757.
7 1. Id.
72. Oral Argument at 19:57, American Civil Liberties Union, et al., v. James Clapper, et. al. No. 13 Civ.
3994 (WHP), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?321163-1/aclu-v-clapper-oral-argument-phone-re-
cord-surveillance.
73. Section 215 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
topics/section-215
74. Oral Argument at 21:51, American Civil Liberties Union, et al., v. James Clapper, et. al. No. 13 Civ.
3994 (WHP), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?321163-1/aclu-v-clapper-oral-argument-phone-re-
cord-surveillance.
75. Oral Argument at 1:34:31, American Civil Liberties Union, et al., v. James Clapper, et. al. No. 13 Civ.
3994 (WHP), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?321163-1/aclu-v-clapper-oral-argument-phone-re-
cord-surveillance.
76. Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400031/pdf/DCPD-201400031.pdf.
77. Presidential Policy Directive 28-Signals Intelligence Activities, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.
201400031
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persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.78 The order
limits the collection of signals intelligence exclusively to foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence purposes that support national and departmental missions. In so doing, it
specifies that privacy and civil liberties shall be an integral consideration when planning
signals intelligence activities. 79
Following this guidance, the NSA announced the creation of a Civil Liberties and Pri-
vacy Officer to provide advice to the director and to oversee the NSA's civil liberties and
privacy-related activities. The officer also is expected to develop measures to further
strengthen the NSA's privacy protections.8 0
Finally, the presidential directive further refines the process for collecting signals intel-
ligence and directs the intelligence community to establish policies and procedures that
are reasonably designed to minimize the dissemination and retention of personal informa-
tion collected.81
C. INTELLIGENCE CASES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION COURT OF JUSTICE
On April 8, 2014, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union
issued a judgment8 2 on two combined cases from Ireland and Austria considering the va-
lidity of a directive issued by the European Parliament and the Council on March 15,
2006-Directive 2006/24/EC.83 The directive requires:
telecommunications companies to keep EU citizens' data for between six months and
two years '[b]ecause retention of data has proved to be such a necessary and effective
investigative tool for law enforcement in several Member States, and in particular
concerning serious matters such as organized crime and terrorism, it is necessary to
ensure that retained data are made available to law enforcement authorities for a
certain period.' 84
The Court was asked to address the validity of the directive in light of two liberties
found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: the fundamental
right to respect for private life and the fundamental right to the protection of personal
data.85 The Court struck down the directive, concluding that it "entails a wide-ranging
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Press Release, U.S. Nat'1 Security Agency, NSA Announces New Civil Liberties and Privacy Offcer (Jan.
24, 2014), available at https://www.nsa.gov/public-info/press-room/2014/civil_1iberties-privacy-officer
.shtml.
81. Presidential Policy Directive 28-Signals Intelligence Activities, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201400
031
82. Digital Rights Ireland, Ltd. v. Ireland, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf.
text=&docid=150642&pagelndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=127299 [herein-
after EU Court of Justice Judgment].
83. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF.
84. Andrea Germanos, 'Victory for Defenders of Privacy': Top EU Court Smacks Down Surveillance Law, COM-
MON DREAMS, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2014/04/08/victory-defenders-privacy-top-eu-court-
smacks-down-surveillance-law.
85. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts. 7, 8, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
charter/pdf/texten.pdf.
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and particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in the legal order of
the EU," and that such interference is not "precisely circumscribed . . . to ensure that it is
actually limited to what is strictly necessary."8 6 The Court found "particularly serious"
the perception of a constant surveillance state that is created when data is retained without
the knowledge of the registered user.87
V. Cybersecurity Developments
Several important U.S. cybersecurity developments occurred during the past year. As
discussed below, these included: (i) the promulgation by the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) of a Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity; (ii) the indictment of five members of the Chinese People's Liberation
Army (PLA) by a grand jury in federal district court in Pennsylvania on charges of cyber
espionage and related crimes brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (iii) the
failure of Congress to pass any cybersecurity legislation.
In February 2014, NIST issued Version 1.0 of the Framework for Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Framework).8 8 Mandated to develop a voluntary Frame-
work pursuant to Executive Order 13636 of February 12, 2013, NIST facilitated useful
collaboration between government and private industry that resulted in the creation of a
Framework that uses a common language to address and manage cybersecurity risk in a
cost-effective way based on business needs without placing additional regulatory require-
ments on businesses. 89
The Framework consists of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Profile,
and the Framework Implementation Tiers. 90 The Framework Core contains a set of
cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and informative references that are common across
critical infrastructure sectors, providing the detailed guidance for developing individual
organizational Framework Profiles. 9 1 Through use of the Framework Profiles, entities are
able to align their cybersecurity activities with their business requirements, risk tolerances,
and resources. The Framework Tiers provide a mechanism for businesses to view and
understand the characteristics of their approach to managing cybersecurity risk.92 ColleC-
tively, the Framework is intended to allow organizations of any size and with any degree
of cybersecurity sophistication to apply the principles and best practices of risk manage-
ment to develop organization-specific solutions that will help them reduce and better
manage cybersecurity risks. 93 Recognizing that the Framework will need to be updated to
keep pace with changes in technology, threats, and other factors, and in order to incorpo-
rate lessons learned from its use, NIST intends for the Framework to be a "living docu-
86. EU Court of Justice Judgment, T 65.
87. EU Court of Justice Judgment, T 37.
88. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY, http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf (2014).




93. Id. at 2.
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ment" that will be revised on a regular basis. This is why the initial Framework document
is designated, "Version 1.0."94
NIST's Framework was the subject of considerable discussion during a panel program
on "Private Contractors, Snowden, and Cybersecurity" that took place during the ABA
Section of International Law's Spring Meeting in New York City on April 3, 2014. Dur-
ing the program, one of the speakers, Joel Brenner, a former Inspector General of the
NSA under President George W. Bush and currently a Robert Wilhelm Fellow at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies, acknowledged
that NIST's Framework was a good starting point. He further recommended that law
firms, companies, and government agencies also review the Critical Security Controls that
were originally developed under the auspices of the SANS Institute95 and are now admin-
istered and updated by the Council on CyberSecurity, a not-for-profit organization com-
mitted to the security of the open Internet. 96 Another speaker, Evan Bayh, former
Senator and former Governor of Indiana, echoed Mr. Brenner's recommendation and
urged Congress to pass necessary cybersecurity legislation, although he stated that he did
not think Congress would take such action until a cyber-attack significantly debilitates a
corporate or government computer system. 97
Revelation of significant cyber-attacks on the computer systems of several large U.S.
companies was disclosed when the DOJ unsealed a grand jury indictment against five
members of the Chinese PLA on May 19, 2014. In the DOJ press release issued in con-
nection with the indictment, Attorney General Eric Holder stated, "This is a case alleging
economic espionage by members of the Chinese military and represents the first ever
charges against a state actor for this type of hacking," and that "[t]he range of trade secrets
and other sensitive business information stolen in this case is significant and demands an
aggressive response." 98
In the unsealed indictment, the following companies were identified as being the vic-
tims of the crimes allegedly perpetrated between 2006 and 2014 by the five members of
the Chinese PLA who were indicted: Alcoa, Inc.; Westinghouse Electric Co.; United
States Steel Corp. (U.S. Steel); Allegheny Technologies Inc. (ATI); the United Steel, Pa-
per and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers
International Union (USW); and various U.S. subsidiaries of SolarWorld AG.99 The
charges in the indictment included, among other things: economic espionage; trade secret
theft; aggravated identity theft; and conspiracy to commit computer fraud.100
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., SANS Institute, Crtical Security Controls, https://www.sans.org/crical-security-controls/ (last
visited Dec. 1, 2014).
96. See Council on CyberSecurity, Critical Cybersecurity Controls (Vers. 5.1), http://www.counciloncyber-
security.org/critical-controls/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2014).
97. See Stephen Joyce, Congress Won't Approve Cybersecurity Law Until Attack Compels It to Act, Bayh Says,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.bna.com/congress-wont-approve-nl7179889411/ (last visited
Nov. 30, 2014).
98. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage
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Notwithstanding the significant cyber-attacks referenced in the unsealed indictment
against the five members of the Chinese PLA, or several other large-scale attacks perpe-
trated in 2014 against J.P. Morgan and numerous U.S. government agencies by entities
believed to be supported by the Russian government or the Chinese government, Con-
gress failed to pass any cybersecurity legislation in 2014.
VI. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levantiol
June 2014 saw the rise to international prominence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) in its current forml02 when it swept across northern Iraq, capturing Mosul
and the Beiji oil refinery in Iraq. Seizing swaths of Sunni-controlled territory across
northeast Syria and northern Iraq 0 3 and imposing its harsh brand of governance, the
group declared a caliphate called the Islamic State, and named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as
Caliph.
Retribution is swift and brutal against anyone who opposes its harsh theocratic rule.
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republico4
investigated the treatment of Syrians living under ISIL control. The investigation, 05
based on over 300 first-hand victim and witness statements, "documents shocking ac-
counts of the armed group's use of terror to subjugate Syrians living in its areas of control,
as well as the use of extreme violence against both civilians and captured fighters."106
ISIL also works to build its version of a state and citizenry. It follows a standard meth-
odology. Once it establishes military control, "it takes over power plants, factories, baker-
ies, and food supplies,"107 as well as oil fields.1os "Its lawyers draft modern contracts that
spell out Islamic responsibilities of local organizations that want to work with the dis-
101. Various entities refer to the group alternately as ISIS, ISIL, the Islamic State, Al Nasra Front, DAIISH,
and DAESH. Ray Sanchez, ISIS, ISIL, or the Islamic State, CNN (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/
09/09/world/meast/isis-isil-islamic-state/. This contribution refers to the group as ISIL.
102. ISIS is an evolved form of Al Qa'ida in Iraq, an Al Qa'ida offshoot organization founded in 2004 by Al
Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, who pledged his allegiance to bin Laden. For a quick history of ISIS, see Address by
the Honorable Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Brookings Institution (Sept.
3, 2014), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014-09-03%2ORemarks%20for%20the%2OBrook
ings%20Institution.pdf.
103. See, e.g., CNN Library, ISIS Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/
index.html.
104. See the overview available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/lICISyria/Pages/
IndependentlnternationalCommission.aspx.
105. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE SYRIAN ARAIB REPUBLIC, RULE OF TERROR: LIvING UNDER ISIS IN
SYRIA, (Nov. 14, 2014), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ColSyria/
HRCCRPISIS_14Nov2014.pdf [hereinafter IICI Report].
106. United Nations Human Rights, UN Commission oflnquiry: Syrian Victims Reveal ISIS's Calculated Use of
Brutality and Indoctrination (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Dis-
playNews.aspx?NewslD=15295&LanglD=E#sthash.OxLvFuGx.dpuf http://www.ohchr.org/EN/New-
sEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=15295&LangID=E.
107. Thanassis Cambanis, The Surprising Appeal of ISIS, BOSTON GLOBE (Jun. 29, 2014).
108. RT.com, Islamic State Seeks Crisis Manager to Save Ailing Oil Revenues-report, http://rt.com/news/
201623-islamic-state-oil-manager/ (Nov. 2, 2014).
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placed."1 0 9 ISIL asks the governed to actively participate in "spreading the call to
God."'' 0
The U.N. Security Council passed a resolution recognizing ISIL as a terror group and
calling for action against it,"' as well as a second resolution addressing foreign terror
fighters assisting ISIL.112 In response, President Obama announced a three-pronged ap-
proach focused on expanding a U.S. air campaign; drawing on a full range of counterter-
rorism tools to stem the tide of foreign fighters; and increasing support for friendly
foreign ground forces.113 The asserted domestic legal authority"i 4 for taking action
against ISIL is the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which was
passed as a joint resolution by both houses of the U.S. Congress shortly after the 2001
terror attacks."' However, it was later reported that the President would be seeking a
new authorization to use military force.116 Arguably, the AUMF does not cover training
moderate rebel forces in Syria." 7
As for the plan's international law basis, Iraq expressly requested "the United States ...
to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds, with [its] express
consent.""1 8 To this end, sixty nations announced their intent to cooperate in coordinated
action against ISIL.119 The U.S.-led coalition met in Brussels to set up the structure by
which it will coordinate actions. The participating states agreed to five lines of effort to
defeat ISIL:
* Supporting military operations, capacity building, and training;
* Stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters;
* Cutting off ISIL's access to financing and funding;
* Addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises; and
109. Thanassis Cambanis, The Surprising Appeal of ISIS, BOSTON GLOBE, Jun. 29, 2014.
110. Id.
111. S.C. Res. 2701, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2170 (Aug. 15, 2014).
112. S.C. Res. 2701, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2178 (Sep. 24, 2014).
113. Press Release, The White House, Background Conference Call on the President's Address to the Nation
(Sept. 10, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/background-confer-
ence-call-presidents-address-nation [hereinafter White House Press Release].
114. Id. See also Letter from President Obama to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President
Pro Tempore of the Senate, War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq (Sept. 23, 2014), available at http://www.gpo
.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400698/pdf/DCPD-201400698.pdf.
115. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for
the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). However,
critics of this theory for authorization point to the disavowal of ISIS by Al-Qa-ida; see Liz Sly, Al-Qaeda
Disavows Any Ties with Radical Islamist ISIS Group in Syria, Iraq, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2014).
116. Karen DeYoung, Obama to Seek New Authorization for Fight Against Islamic State, WASH. POST (Nov. 5,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-to-seek-new-authorization-for-fight-
against-islamic-state/2014/11/05/67bb0998-652c-1le4-bbl4-4cfeale742d5_story.html; Karen DeYoung,
President and Congress Play Waiting Game on Authorization for Islamic State Action, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nad6onal-security/president-and-congress-play-waiting-game-on-au-
thorization-for-islamic-state-action/2014/12/04/Of3 73 39c-7bec- 1 1e4-9a2 7-6fdbc612bff8_story.html.
117. White House Press Release, supra note 113.
118. Letter from The Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations to the President of the
United Nations Security Council (Sep. 20, 2014), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/
%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-SCD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_691.pdf.
119. Joint Statement by Coalition Partners at Counter-ISIL Meeting (Dec. 3, 2014), available at http://
iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/12/20141203311598.html#axzz3Kzz7OMHv.
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Exposing ISIL's true nature (ideological de-legitimization).1 20
Iran has asserted its role in helping to defeat ISIL. Iran has also said, however, that it
will not coordinate with the United States or the U.S.-led coalition, which Ayatollah Ali
Hosseini Khamenei dismissed as an alternate way to subvert the Muslim world.121 Iranian
F-4 aircraft were sighted bombing ISIL positions in December.1 22 Commander of the
Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani, has seen increased media coverage in the latter part of
2014, to include coverage for his Quds Force assisting the Kurdish Peshmerga in the fight
against ISIL.1 2 3
Turkey is in a tenuous position as it tries to balance ongoing tensions with Kurds while
also providing support for Kurds battling ISIL.124 Media reports indicate that Turkey and
the United States have struck a deal that will result in greater involvement by Turkey.1 25
In exchange for a buffer zone insider Syria along the entirety of the Syria-Turkey border,
the United States will get access to the air base at Incirlik.126 However, "part of the
[United States'] risk assessment is whether Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will continue
to allow overflights of his territory without activating Syrian air defenses, as he has with
U.S. aircraft now striking the Islamic State in areas largely to the east of the proposed new
front."127
120. Id.
121. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/22642; Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Twitter Post (Nov. 25, 2014), https:/
/twitter.com/khameneiir/status/537169493282529280. See also Tim Arango & Thomas Erdbrink, U.S. and
Iran Both Attack ISIS, but Try Not to Look Like Allies, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 2014.
122. Ian Black, Iranian Air Force Bombs Targets in Iraq, Says Pentagon, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/03/iran-bombs-isis-in-iraq-says-us, Julian Borger, Iran Air Strikes
Against ISIS Requested by Iraqi Government, Says Tehran, THE GUARDIAN (DEC. 5, 2014), http://www.theguar-
dian.com/world/2014/dec/05/iran-conducts-air-strikes-against-isis-exremists-iraq.
123. Quds Force Chief Suleimani Reportedly Helped Peshmerga Defeat IS In Diyala, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/irgc-isis-suleimani-kurdish-iraq-islamic-state-fight-
ing/26709813.html.
124. Gontil Tol, Turkey's Tough Choice: Take on ISIS or the PKK?, CNN (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/
2014/10/07/opinion/turkey-isis-pkk/index.html.
125. Karen DeYoung, U.S. Considers Opening a New Front Against Islamic State to Create a Safe Zone in Syria,
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